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Long: Introduction Student Symposium - Interpreting the Statutory Defin

INTRODUCTION*
JOSEPH C. LONGt
It is interesting that in the more than 60 years of securities regulation
in this country,' we still have no clearly -accepted definition of a security.
In this regard we are somewhat in the same position as some of the members of the United States Supreme Court when dealing with obscenity: We
can generally tell a security when we see one, on a case by case basis, but
have been unwilling to attempt to give a generic definition to the term. Instead, both -the courts and the legislatures have approached the problem of
definition by attempting to enumerate those things which they felt were
securities rather than trying to isolate those factors which could be considered common to all securities and then re-drafting the definition by specification of these characteristics.
The lack of an adequate definition was apparent from the very beginning. The first securities act did not even contain a defintion of a security,
but merely assumed that the word had a common meaning. 2 Subsequent
state acts added rudimentary enumerative definitions. 3 The beginnings of
* Copyright @ 1974 Joseph C. Long.
t Associate Professor of Law, University of Oklahoma; B.A., J.D., University of
Missouri, Columbia.
.1.It is generally acknowledged that the first securities act was the Kansas Act
of 1911. Kans. Laws 1911, ch. 133 (codified at KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 17-1201 to 171275 (1964)). By 1913, 23 additional states had adopted securities acts by and large

based upon the Kansas model.

J. MOFSKY, BLUE SKY RESTRICTION ON NEw BUSINESS

PROMOTIONS 14 n.35 (1971). In a way it is misleading to refer to these early acts
as securities acts because they were more accurately statutes regulating the issuance of
securities by investment companies. Probably the first true securities act, in the sense
that it attempted to regulate the securities rather than the company issuing them, was the
Illinois Securities Act of 1919. Ill.
Laws 1919, at 353, as amended ILL. ANN. STAT. ch.
121 1/2, §§ 137.1-137.19 (Smith-Hurd 1960). This Illinois Act quickly became the
model for "second generation" securities acts and was used by the Uniform Commissioners on State Laws as a model for their Uniform Sale of Securities Act. 1929 HANDBOOK
OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS OF UNIFORM

STATE LAWS AND PRO-

not be confused with
the more modem Uniform Securities Act which is presently in force in one form or another in 31 states. See 1943 HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF, COMCEEDINGS 131, 173. This statute was withdrawn in 1943 and should
MISSIONERS OF UNIFORM STATE LAWS AND PROCEEDINGS 81,
THE NATIONAL

CONFERENCE OF

COMMISSIONERS

305; 1956 HANDBOOK OF

OF UNIFORM STATE LAWS AND

PRO-

182; Uniform Securities Act, 1 CCH BLUE SKY L. REP. 1 4901 (1973).
2. Kans. Laws 1911, ch. 133, § I provided that investment companies could not

CEEDINGS

sell "any stock, bonds or other securities of any kind or character" without first registering them.
3. The 1913 California statute provided: "The term, 'security,' when used in this
act, includes the stock, stock certificate, bonds, and other evidences of indebtedness,
other than promissory notes not offered to the public by the maker thereof, of an in-
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our modern enumerative definition are found in the Illinois Securities Act
of 1919 which provided:
The word "securities" shall include stocks, bonds, debentures, notes,
participation certificates, certificates of shares or interests, preorganizational certificates and subscription, certificates evidencing shares in
trust estates or associations and profit sharing certificates.4
This 1919 definition foreshadowed the approach that other legislatures
were to follow. First, the definition would contain a series of items having
rather fixed, generally recognized meanings such as stock, bonds, and debentures. These specific terms were then followed by a series of general terms
having no fixed legal meaning, such as profit-sharing certificates 5 and evidences of indebtedness,6 which were included in an attempt to cover the
unusual or irregular securities.
Through the 1920's, as new, irregular investment forms appeared, the

legislatures would simply add additional general terms in hopes of plugging
the gap. 7 The Securities Act of 1933,8 however, tended to act as a catalyst

vestment company." Cal. Stat. 1913, ch. 353, § 2(b), as amended, CAL. CORP. CODE
§ 25019 (Deering Supp. 1974). The 1913 Wisconsin statute similarly provided: "'Security' or 'securities' mean any bond, stock, notes, or other obligations or evidence of
indebtedness which constitutes evidence of, or is secured by, title to, interest in or loan
upon any or all of the property of such investment company." Wis. Laws 1913, ch.
756, § 1(c), as amended, WIs. STAT. ANN. § 551.02 (1971).
4. Il.Laws 1919, § 2, at 353, as amended ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 121 1/2, § 137.2
(Smith-Hurd 1960).
5. This term still does not have a fixed meaning. Early attempts were made to
distinguish it from the other general forms of securities. See, e.g., SEC v. Mining
Truth Publishing Co., 1 S.E.C. 469 (E.D. Wash. 1937). However, more recently the
tendency has been to treat the term rather interchangeably with the term "investment
contract." Professor Loss suggests that the main difference between the two may lie
in that a profit-sharing certificate may require a writing in the form of the certificate
while an investment contract may not. 1 L. Loss SECURITIES REGULATION 488 (2d ed.
1961). Very recently courts appear to be attempting to re-establish a distinction between the two categories in an effort to avoid the definition of investment contract established by the Supreme Court in SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S.
293 (1946). See, e.g., SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enterprises, Inc., 348 F. Supp.
766 (D. Ore. 1972) (alternative holding), af 'd on other grounds, 474 F.2d 476
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, -U.S. -, 94 S.Ct. 117, 38 L. Ed. 2d 53 (1973); State ex
rel. Fisher v. World Mkt. Centers, Inc., 3 CCH BLUE SKY L. REP.
71,034 (Okla.
Dist. Ct., Okla. County, June 2, 1972), af 'd, 44 Okla. Bar J. 2218 (Okla. Ct. App.
1973).
6. This term did not have any definition at all in securities law until United
States v. Austin, 462 F.2d 724, 736 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1048 (1972)
where it was held to mean:
The term "evidence of indebtedness" is not limited to a promissory note or other
simple acknowledgment of a debt owing and is held to include all contractual obligations to pay in the future for consideration presently received.
This definition has recently been considered and applied to commodity option contracts
in King Commodity Co. v. State, 3 CCH BLUE SKY L. REP. 71,121 (Tex. Civ. App.Dallas March 11, 1974). See also Hamilton Jewelers v. Department of Corps., 112
Cal. Rptr. 387 (Dist. Ct. App. 1974).
7. Thus the Minnesota Act of 1919 added the now famous category of investment
contracts. Minn. Gen. Laws 1919, ch. 105. The 1923 Missouri statute was closely
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in this process of definition by enumeration.9 Congress examined the existing state definitions and combined most of the general phrases into the single
enumerative definition now found in Section 2(1) of that Act. 10 It should
be noted that several phrases often found in the pre-existing state definitions
are conspicuously absent from the definition. These are the phrases "beneficial interests in or title to property or profits" and "interests in foreign real
estate."" This federal definition has served as the model for most of the
modern state enumerative definitions. Professor Loss drew heavily upon
that definition when he drafted the Uniform Securities Act 1 2 which has been
substantially adopted by more than 30 jurisdictions.1 3
Lack of an adequate definition has not been a serious problem through
much of the history of securities regulation because, by and large, offerings
have tended to be of established "regular" forms of securities, such as stock,
bonds, and debentures, where there is little question that the instruments
come within the regulaftory purview of the securities acts. However, there
have been certain ,times when for one reason or another the traditional capital markets have tended to break down. 1 4 When this occurs, a flock of irpatterned on the Illinois statute but added a number of additional terms such as "certificate of interest in an oil, gas, or mining lease" and "beneficial interest in or title
to property or profits." Mo. Laws 1923, § 2(c), at 201, as amended, Mo. REV. STAT.
§ 409.020 (1952).
8. 15 U.S.C. § 77a to 77aa (1970).
9. This is not to say that legislatures have not continued to use this device. They
have to a limited extent. For example, several states, including Oklahoma, reacted to
the abuse created by the widespread sale of unregulated commodity option contracts
in 1972 and 1973 by amending the definition of a security to specifically cover these
options. See OKLA. STAT. ANN. § 2(20)(o) (Supp. 1973). Such an amendment would
appear to have been unnecessary. King Commodity Co. v. State, 3 CCH BLUE SKY
L. REP.
71,121 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas March 11, 1974). But see International
Commodity Trust, Inc. v. Fisher, 3 CCH BLUE SKY L. REP. 71,075 (Okla. Dist. Ct.,
Okla. County, May 14, 1973).
10. 15 U.S.C. § 77b(1) (1970).
11. As originally enacted the Securities Act of 1933 did contain as a part of the
definition a "certificate of interest in property, tangible or intangible." Act of May
27, 1933, ch. 38, § 2(1), 48 Stat. 74. However, this category was removed in the 1934
amendments "as possibly involving too broad and uncertain application." H.R. REP.
No. 1838, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1934). The effect of this deletion is discussed in
Glen-Arden Commodities, Inc. v. Costantino, [Current Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
94,436 (2d Cir. March 14, 1974).
12. Official Comment to Section 401(1), UNIFORM SECURITIES ACT 7 UNIFORM
LAWS ANN. 749 (Master ed. 1970); Uniform Securities Act, 1 CCH BLUE SKY L. REP.
4931, at 727-30 (1973). See also the drafter's comments, L. Loss & E. CowETT,
BLUE SKY LAW 350 (1958).

13. 1 CCH BLUE SKY L. REP.
4901, at 701-2 (1973) shows that the Uniform
Act has been adopted entirely or in substantial part by 29 states and the District of
Columbia and Puerto Rico. Since that date, West Virginia became the 33d jurisdiction
to adopt the Uniform Act. SEC. REG. & L. REP. (No. 246), at A-18 (April 3, 1974).
14. My own unscientific observation is that this tends to happen during periods at
either end of the economic cycle. In periods of rampant prosperity, investors appear
to have more money than the normal capital market can utilize, leaving an opening
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regular financing gimmicks, some legitimate, others extremely fraudulentappears on the scene. This phenomenon occured in the mid- and late
1920's' 5 and to a lesser extent in the 1930's.16 It recurred in the 1960's
with the emergence of the founder-membership and Glen Turner-type
17
schemes.
Since 1970 the regulatory agencies and the courts have been inundated
with irregular investment devices which they have had to consider and measure against the statutory definitions to determine whether the devices are
securities. These opportunities range from the more legitimate condominium and resort membership' 8 and lease-back agreements' 9 to the often fraud2
ulent sales of commodity options 20 or coins and bullion. '
for unusual marginal operation which the investor does not examine with as great care
because he has no great fear of loss. At the other extreme, in a period of depression,
there is often a distrust especially among the smaller investors of the established capital markets so that these investors seek to place their money safely outside the established capital framework in the unusual or irregular investment scheme.
15. See, e.g., 1925 IND. ATT'Y GEN. ANN. REP. 154 and 1926 IND. ATT'Y GEN.
ANN. REP. 254 outlining a scheme strikingly similar to the founder-membership
scheme in State Comm'r of Sec. v. Hawaii Mkt. Center, Inc., 485 P.2d 105 (Hawaii
1971). See also 20 Wis. ATr'Y GEN. OP. 176 (1931) and Brownie Oil Co. v. Railroad
Comm'n, 240 N.W. 827 (Wis. 1932) for a scheme to finance the building of gas stations through the sale of gas coupon books and attached "good-will" bonds.
16. One of the hot schemes of the late 1930's was the sale of whiskey warehouse
receipts. See State v. Unger, 296 N.W. 629 (Wis. 1941); 1934 ORE. Ar'Y GEN. OP.
165. This scheme has re-emerged recently with the offer for sale of scotch whisky
warehouse receipts. Glen-Arden Commodities, Inc. v. Costantino, [Current Binder]
CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
94,436, at 95,503 (2d Cir. March 14, 1974); SEC v. Haffenden-Rimar Int'l, Inc., 362 F. Sunp. 323 (E.D. Va. 1973); PA. Arr'Y GEN. OP. No.
49, 3 CCH BLUE SKY L. REP. 71.094 at 67,396 (1973).
17. See, e.g., SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enterprises, Inc., 474 F.2d 476 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, - U.S. -, 94 S. Ct. 117, 38 L. Ed. 2d 53 (1973); State Comm'r of Sec.
v. Hawaii Mkt. Center, Inc., 485 P.2d 105 (Hawaii 1971). Another scheme popular
in the 1920's which re-emerged was the sale of fur-bearing animals to be raised and
marketed by the seller. See Miller v. Central Chinchilla Group, Inc., [Current Binder]
CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
94,465, at 95,636 (8th Cir. March 28, 1974); Continental
Marketing Corp. v. SEC, 387 F.2d 466 (10th Cir. 1967).
18. SEC v. Marasol Properties, [1973 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
94,159 (D.D.C. September 28, 1973); State v. American Campground, Inc., 3 CCH
BLUE SKY L. REP.
71,046 (Ore. Cir. Ct. December 15, 1972); Great W. Campers
Ass'n, [1971-72 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
78,386 (SEC NAL August 13, 1971); SEC Securities Act Release No. 5347 (January 4, 1973), 1 CCH FED.
SEC. L. REP.
79,163 (1973); Vacations Unlimited (Ore. Corp. Comm'n December
18, 1973); HAWAu ATr'Y GEN. OP. No. 66-12 (March 29, 1966); Grimes & King, A
Look at Condominium Offerings Under Federal Securities Law, 9 IDAHO L. REV. 149
(1973); Metzinger, The Condominium as a Security, 2 COLO. LAw. 19 (May 1973).
19. Hurberman v. Denny's Restaurants, Inc., 337 F. Supp. 1249 (N.D. Cal. 1972);
Rice v. Bogart, 272 Ill. App. 292 (Ct. App. 1933); Financial Analytics Corp., [1973
Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
79,498 (SEC NAL August 15, 1973);
SEC No Action Letter, National Marketing Corp. (January 3, 1974).
20. In re Traders Int'l, Ltd., [Current Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
94,529
(D. Nev. 1974); King Commodity Co. v. State, 3 CCH BLUE SKY L. REP.
71,121
(Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas March 11, 1974); People v. Puts & Calls, Inc., 3 CCH BLUE
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. Tied to the existing statutory enumerative definitions, both the agencies
and the courts have found themselves ill-equipped to handle the task and
the results at best are rather spotty. 22 For the most part, the courts have
attempted to develop formulas or definitions for the individual general
phrases found within the enumerative definition. In doing so all too often
there has been little attempt to consider whether the attributes assigned to
the individual categories are consistent with the attributes assigned to the
other general categories or whether these characteristics are consistent with
23
the general purpose behind the securities act itself.
In 1967, Professor Coffey, realizing the problems of attempting to develop a cohesive definition of a security by enumeration and definition of
general terms on a random case by case basis, suggested -that there might
be certain characteristics common to those things which are generally accepted as coming within the purview of the securities acts. 24 If these charL. REP. T 71,090 (Cal. Super. Ct. June 21, 1973); Shapiro v. First Federated
Commodity Trust Co., 3 CCH BLUE SKY L. REP.
71,071 (Md. Cir. Ct. May 30,
1973); Clayton Brokerage Co. v. Mouer, 3 CCH BLUE SKY L. REP.
71,125 (Tex.
Dist. Ct. April 18, 1974); In re Secured Commodities, (Ark. Sec. Comm'n January 22,
1974); Long, The Naked Commodity Option Contract as a Security, 15 Wm.& MARY
SKY

L. REV. 211 (1974).

21. State v. International Silver Mint Corp., 3 CCH BLUE SKY L. REP. 71,066
(Idaho Dist. Ct. July 20, 1972); Interest Coin Exch., Inc., Cease and Desist Order (Ind.
Sec. Comm'n October 29, 1973); In re American Coin Exchange Determination, Prohibition and Revocation Order (Wis. Sec. Comm'n May 17, 1974). It is my understanding from talking with the Texas Securities Commissioner, Ray Mouer, that the Texas
Securities Commission and the Texas Attorney General have filed suits against Secure
Monetary Systems, Inc., Southwest Coin Exchange, and Pacific Coast Coin Exchange.
22. For example, the Securities and Exchange Commission, normally considered
the leader in the area of regulation, was extremely late in entering the battle against
the Glenn Turner-type promotion. It did so only after the state decisions indicated
that this type of scheme could be controlled under the existing securities statutes. Even
after the Commission had won its test case at the trial level, one of the Commissioners
announced to a national meeting of state securities administrators that the federal definition would have to be amended because the Commission's jurisdiction over this type
of scheme was highly questionable! Likewise the Commission was slow in coming to
grips with the commodity option problem and there is still no satisfactory authority
at the federal level on this question. Certainly not all the blame belongs to the regulatory agencies. The courts have made their share of mistakes. Compare the extremely
narrow decision in Koscot Interplanetary, Inc. v. King, 452 S.W.2d 531 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Austin 1970, writ ref'd n.r.e.), with the very expansive opinion in King Commodity Co. v. State, 3 CCH BLUE SKY L. REP.
71,121 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas
March 11, 1974).
23. For an in depth 'discussion of this problem in connection with the general category of "investment contract," see Long, An Attempt to Return "Investment Contracts"
to the Mainstream of Securities Regulation, 24 OKLA. L. REV. 135 (1971).
24. Coffey, The Economic Realities of a "Security": It There a More Meaningful
Formula?, 18 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 367 (1967). Coffey's formula has received judicial recognition as the definition of an investment contract in State Comm'r of Sec.
v. Hawaii Mkt. Center, Inc., 485 P.2d 105, 109 (Hawaii 1971). This started a scramble by many. courts to abandon the mechanical interpretations of the general categories
in favor of finding what the individual court views as the economic realities of securities.
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acteristics could be isolated and identified, then it would become a rather
simple matter to determine whether a particular item was a security. All
that would be necessary is to measure the factual pattern developed in each
case against the general definition by specification to determine whether the
common characteristics were present in the device being considered. In
1971, after working with the bewildering and often conflicting morass of
case 'law in connection with an early founder-membership case, I became
convinced that Professor Coffey was correct that the only way to provide
guidance in the area was to attempt to develop a definition of a security
25
by specification rather than by enumeration.
It is the purpose of this symposium to carry forward the idea that a
definition of a "security" by specification is possible. In the remaining portion of this article, I will outline those items that I have come to believe
are characteristics common to all generally recognized forms of securities.
The student articles to follow will then examine selected specific portions of
the present enumerative definition of a "security" which are of current interest. The students will examine in greater detail the existing case law in
these areas and will then attempt to test the thesis that a common uniform
definition by specification is possible. Only by such an empirical study can
the theory be measured against reality and its truth or falsity established.
Before beginning this process, however, the reader should be cautioned
about several things. First, since this is a symposium written by a number
of different people having differing views of securities regulation and what
it should encompass, it is natural that not all the authors will completely
agree on all matters. For example, I am of the opinion that the newer decisions bringing devices such as the Glenn Turner-type of scheme and commodity option contracts within the purview of securities regulation is not an
expansion of the concept of this regulation, but rather merely a recognition
of principles which have been inherent in securities regulation from its inception. In short, there is no real expansion of the extent of securities regulation, merely a recognition of its original scope and its extension to include
previously uncontrolled items which fall within that original scope. From
this conclusion it follows then that the regulatory agencies are not usurping
a new area but merely occupying an area of given regulation which they
were not completely occupying before. Reading the student papers, however, it becomes evident that a number of them consider the new developments to be an intrusion into an area not previously within the regulatory
authority of the agencies. Certainly there are legal scholars of the first
magnitude who would tend to agree with this opinion. 26 The reader is left
25. See Long, An Attempt to Return "Investment Contracts" to the Mainstream
of Securities Regulation, 24 OKLA. L. REV. 135 (1971).
See also Hannan & Thomas,
The Importance of Economic Reality and Risk in Defining Federal Securities, 25 HASTrNOs L.J. 219 (1974).

26. Professor Loss, for example, initially took the position that the founder-mem-
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to form his own opinion on this point.
Second, since there are more than 60 years of case law in this area
developed on a case by case basis, it is impossible -to reconcile all the cases
holding various devices to be securities with the characteristics which will
be outlined. This does not mean that we are attempting to start fresh and
ignore the existing body of case law. While such an approach is theoretically possible, it s not practical. If our project has any hope of practical
success in getting the courts to recognize our approach, it is necessary to
show them how our test found recognition in prior decisional law. Obviously then, the reader can find cases which will contain ideas and holdings
directly contrary to those outlined here. Again, the reader must decide for
himself which he wishes to accept.
Finally, since at present the definition of a "security" is controlled by Congress and the state legislatures and is purely a definition by enumeration,
we will see that our common characteristics cannot be applied to some of
these definitions. 27 I think that there are two obvious conclusions which
the reader can draw from this: Either the legislatures have extended coverage to certain items which conceptually are not securities or the common
characteristics which I will outline are not "common characteristics" and
2z
therefore our test fails.
Turning our attention now to formulating a definition for "securities" by
specification rather than enumeration, the first problem we must consider
is the appropriate scope of the securities acts. Although this appears to be
the most basic of questions, it is given little actual consideration. Intuitive
consideration of this point indicates some difference of opinion as to the ap"propriate scope of the acts. I think we need to consider this problem from
two different aspects. The first consideration is whether the securities acts
are intended to cover all investment opportunities or only a certain segment.
bership schemes were not within the scope of securities regulation. Letter from Louis
Loss to James L. Shores, Jr., concerning Alabama Market Centers, Inc., November 27,
1968, on file with the Arkansas Securities Division.
27. It is amazing how few of these there are in view of the legislature's ability
to make anything a security merely by inclusion within the statutory definition without
regard to the other items also covered. Most of these specific enumerations center around the concepts of "benefic'al ownership in real or personal property" and
"interests in land located outside the state." There is also some problem with the inclusion of all promissory notes and possibly voting trust certificates. This inclusion
suggests that there is in fact a generally understood, if inarticulated, concept of what
is a security. The same problem of articulation is true in the torts area. We have
a system of tort law which works relatively well as a practical matter, but which is
extremely difficult to explain from a conceptual standpoint.
28. We are not suggesting that the courts ignore the statutes as they are written,
but rather that they should recognize that the legislature may have mixed apples and
oranges in the definition. The courts should deal with items in the definition which
are not conceptually securities separately from those items which are conceptually securities.
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If we conclude that the securities acts are intended to cover some but not
all investments the obvious corollary question is how we identify the ones
,to be covered and separate them from those investment opportunities which
are not to be included. The second aspect of the problem is whether the
securities acts are limited to covering only investment opportunities.
Let us now consider each of these points in turn. There is some rather
strong historical evidence that the securities acts were intended to have extremely broad coverage and to protect the public against unsound investments of all kinds. 29 The 1919 Minnesota Act added to the growing list
of general terms describing a security with the now famous phrase "investment contract. '3 0 The following year in State v. Gopher Tire & Rubber
Co.,31 the Minnesota court was called on to determine exactly what an investment contract was. Having no precedent to rely on, the court turned
to the dictionary for a definition of the component words. It defined investment in this manner:
The placing of capital or laying out of money in a way intended to
secure income or profit from its employment
in an "investment" as that
32
word is commonly used and understood.
The certificates sold by the defendant for which the investor paid $50 and
agreed to "assist by word of mouth and in other ways in the sale of tires
and tubes which the defendant will manufacture" in exchange for 10 percent of the price of the goods sold by the defendant's representative in the
area for 20 years33 was held to be a security.
If defendant issued and sold its certificates to purchasers who paid their
money justly expecting to receive an income or3 4profit from the investment, it would seem that the statute should apply.
Read literally, the court would seem to be saying that any contract involving an investment as defined would be an "investment contract." Such
an interpretation would mean that almost any investment opportunity would
be brought within the securities acts, since all involve a contract of pur29. This is somewhat of a misstatement.

It is necessary to distinguish the aims

of the federal securities acts from those of many of the state blue sky acts.

The fed-

eral acts are directed toward full disclosure of information and the prevention of fraud.
The theory behind them is that a person should be free to make a good or bad investment decision as long as he has the necessary information to make an intelligent deci-

sion.

On the other hand, many of the state acts are what are referred to in the trade

as "fair, just and equitable" statutes. See, e.g., TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5811 to 581-39 (1964). Under this type of statute the regulatory agency is given authority

to prevent the sale of any security which it does not think is "fair, just or equitable"
to the investor.

Thus, these statutes are built upon the concept of protecting the public

from fraudulent or unsound investments.
30. Minn. Gen. Laws 1919, ch. 105.
31. 177 N.W. 937 (Minn. 1920).
32. Id. at 938.
33. Id. at 937.
34. Id. at 938.
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chase. Thus the purchase of real estate for speculation would involve an
investment contract3 5 as would the purchase of commodities or commodity
6

3
futures contracts purchased for the same purpose.
Apparently this broad view was accepted by a number of state legislatures
because the definition of "securities" found in some of the state acts include
items not normally thought of as securities. For example, Oklahoma and
Wisconsin have included commodity futures contracts generally within the
definition,3 7 while Florida, Louisiana, and New Hampshire have extended
coverage to investments in warehouse receipts of all types.3
Some five
additional states have provisions covering varying interests in real property
located outside the state.3 9 Other states have or have had other very broad

4
general provisions.

0

This broad concept of "securities," however, appears to have been rejected in the federal acts as they appeared in final form. 4 1 The federal acts
and the great wealth of decisional law under them almost immediately took
a dominant role in the development of securities regulation in this country.
As a result, during the three decades since the enactment of the federal statutes, there has been gradual acceptance by most state courts, regulatory
agencies, and legal scholars that the state securities acts should also be of
a limited scope -relatively co-equal to the scope of the federal acts.4 2 There35. For a recent case taking this position, see Florida Realty, Inc. v. Kirkpatrick,
3 CCH BLUE SKY L. REP. 71,109, at 67,455 (Mo. March 11, 1974).
36. The Wisconsin Commissioner of Securities took this position. Monthly Bul.,
Feb. 1968, CCH BLUE SKY L. REP.
52,707, cited in 4 L. Loss, SECUiTIES REGULATION 2504 (Supp. 1969).
This position was later confirmed by the Wisconsin legislature when it included commodity futures contracts in the definition of "securities" in
the Wisconsin Securities Act of 1968. WIs. STAT. ANN. § 551.02(13)(a) (1971). But
cf. Glen-Arden Commodities, Inc. v. Costantino, [Current Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L.
REP. 94,436 (2d Cir. March 14, 1974).
37. 71 OKLA. STAT. ANN. § 2(20)(o) (Supp. 1973); Ws. STAT. ANN. § 551.02(13)
(a)(1971).
38. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 517.02 (1972); LA. REV. STAT. § 51:701(1) (1950); N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 421.2 (1955). See also N.C. GEN. STAT. § 78-2(g) (1965) (covering whiskey warehouse receipts).
39. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-1252(j) (1964); 15 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. § 32:751
(1965); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 409.401(1) (Supp. 1974); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1707.01
(B) (Baldwin 1970); TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-1602(J) (1964).
40. The present Ohio statute starts out its definition of a security: "'Security'
means any certificate or instrument which represents title to or interest in, or is secured
by any lien or charge upon, the capital, assets, profits, property, or credit of any person or any public governmental body." OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 1707.01(B) (Baldwin
1970). A number of states have or have had definitions containing "beneficial interests in, or title to, property." See, e.g., MISS. CODE ANN. § 75-71-5(c) (1973).
41. See note 11 supra.
42. Within the last year, however, there have been some decided indications that
the states are willing once again to accept a broad role for their securities acts. In
State v. Investors Sec. Corp., 209 N.W.2d 405, 410 (Minn. 1973) the court specifically
reaffirmed its decision in State v. Gopher Tire & Rubber Co., 177 N.W. 937 (Minn.
1920) as to the broad "paternalistic" scope of the Minnesota act and refused to adopt
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fore, for the remainder of this discussion, it will be assumed that the decision
has been irreversibly made that the securities acts are not general investment
protection statutes, but are intended to protect only investors who purchase
certain types of investment opportunities. The test that we propose to develop, then, will be aimed at identifying those investments to be covered
from investment opportunities which are to be left to regulation by other
statutes or the common law.
The second problem that we must consider before turning to the mechanics of our test is whether an item identified as a security will always be
treated as a security so that its disposition will be covered by the securities
acts. This problem has become acute in the area of recovery for fraud.
One of the primary purposes of all securities acts is the prevention and redress of fraud in connection with transactions in securities. Originally, the
state and federal acts were directed at providing a means of recovery for
fraud in connection with the sale of securities. 43 However, the Securities
and Exchange Commission adopted its famous Rule l0b-544 which prohibits
the commission of fraud in the purchase or sale of securities. It is now well
established that this Rule provides an implied civil remedy where such fraud
is practiced either in the sale or purchase of securities. 45 There is some
indication that state acts will likewise be expanded by interpretation to cover
46
fraud in the purchase of securities.
This development, coupled with the extremely broad definition of "sale"
of a security as any disposition for value, 47 has raised the question of
the federal Howey test as the exclusive test for investment contracts. Even more recently the Missouri court in Florida Realty, Inc. v. Kirkpatrick, 3 CCH BLUE SKY L.
REP.
71,109 (Mo. March 11, 1974) rendered an opinion under the portion of the
Missouri statute classifying deferred payment or installment contracts on foreign real
estate to be a security. The opinion could have treated this provision as an aberration
within the statutory definition. Instead, the court went out of its way to suggest that
the coverage of this type of item as a security is consistent with the legislative purpose

of the securities act.
43. L. Loss & E. COWETT,

BLUE SKY LAWS

251-252 (1958).

44.

17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1973).
45. See generally A. BROMBERG, SECURITIES LAW, FRAUD, SEC RULE lOb-5 (1973).
46. Such expansion by implied remedy is not available under the Uniform Securities Act. Mid-Continent Cas. Co. v. McAlester Aircraft, Inc., 349 F.2d 885 (10th Cir.
1965). While section 101 of the Uniform Act closely follows the wording of Rule
lOb-5 and does cover fraud in either the purchase or sale of securities, section 410,

the civil remedies provision, contains subsection (h) which specifically negates any remedies, express or implied, arising from the Act not provided for in section 410 or section 202(e) dealing with suit on a broker-dealers bond. Recovery under section 410(a)
is limited to recovery for fraud in the sale of securities.

At least two states, Washing-

ton and Nebraska, have omitted subsection (h) when adopting the Uniform Act. NEB.
REV. STAT. § 8-118 (Supp. 1973); WASH. REV. CODE AN. § 21.20.430 (Supp. 1974).
As a result the Washington courts have held that a civil remedy may be implied from
the Washington version of section 101.

Clausing v. DeHart, 515 P.2d 982 (Wash.

1973); Shermer v. Baker, 472 P.2d 589 (Wash. Ct. App. 1970).
47. See, e.g., Uniform Securities Act § 401(j)(1) (1957)

which provides:

"'Sale'

or 'sell' includes every contract of sale of, contract to sell, or disposition of, a security
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whether -these anti-fraud provisions should be available where the fraud is
committed in connection with the sale or purchase of an instrument normally
acknowledged to be a security in a non-investment context.
The problem is acutely presented in the case of promissory notes. 48 The
present enumerative definitions make clear that a promissory note is a security.49 Is then the promissory note given by the consumer in the purchase
of an automobile, refrigerator, or house, to be considered a security? If so,
the person giving the note should be entitled to avail himself of the securities acts to avoid the transaction when he discovers that the item was fraudulently represented to him. Clearly the issuance of the promissory note by
the consumer is a "sale" of that note within the definition of sale in the
securities acts in that it is a disposition of the note for value. It is now
equally clear as a result of the decision in Superintendent of Insurance v.
Bankers Life & Casualty Co.50 that the fraud does not have to relate to the
issuance of the security, but merely must have some nexus with the transaction resulting in its issuance. It seems, therefore, that the inescapable answer is that the consumer would be entitled to bring his action under the
securities acts, if the promissory note is a security., 1
This problem of the status of promissory notes has bothered the federal
courts on several recent occasions. 52 In MacAndrews & Forbes v. Amerior interest in a security for value." 1 CCH BLUE SKY L. REP.
4931, at 727 (1973).
48. To a lesser extent the problem is also apparent in the cases of other evidences
of indebtedness. See Sperry & Hutchinson v. Hudson, 226 P.2d 501 (Ore. 1951) (involving the question of whether green "trading" stamps were a security); Hamilton
Jewelers v. Department of Corps., 112 Cal. Rptr. 387 (Dist. Ct. App. 1974) (raising
the question of whether a guarantee to repurchase diamonds was a security).
49. Both the Securities Act of 1933 and the Uniform Securities Act specifically
list any note as a security. 15 U.S.C. § 77b(1) (1970); Uniform Securities Act §
401(1), 1 CCH BLUE SKY L.REP. 4931, at 727 (1973).
50. 404 U.S. 6 (1971).
51. The obvious question might be why would he want to do so. There are several
answers. First, fraud under the securities acts ismuch easier to prove than common
law fraud, since no intent to defraud needs to be shown. Similarly, securities fraud
covers omissions and half-truths often not covered or difficult to prove under common
law fraud. The securities acts also give extended liability to persons involved insome
way with the fraudulent transactions, but who may not have been a party to the actual
fradulent statement. Finally, the person defrauded is entitled under most state statutes
to recover his entire consideration, plus interest from the date of his purchase, plus
court costs and reasonable attorney's fees. See, e.g., Uniform Securities Act § 410, 1
CCH BLUE SKY L. REP.
4940, at 737-38 (1973). It was once thought that these
items of recovery were mandatory. However the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, construing the Colorado law, has recently held these items to be discretionary with
the court. Andrews v. Blue, 389 F.2d 367, 377 (10th Cir. 1973). For a general discussion of the advantages of suing under the securities acts, see Long, Don't Forget
the Securities Acts! 26 OKLA. L. REv. 160 (1973).
52. See Lino v. City Investing Co., 487 F.2d 689 (3d Cir. 1973); McClure v. First
Nat'l Bank, 352 F.Supp. 454 (N.D.Tex. 1973); MacAndrews & Forbes Co. v. American Barmag Corp., 339 F. Supp. 1401 (D.S.C. 1972); Janssen v.Tri-Pac Dev. Corp.,
Civil No. 72-1200 (E.D. Pa., Dec. 1,1972); Joseph v.Norman's Health Club, Inc.,
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can Barmag Corp.53 the plaintiff corporation owned a textile plant where
it processed raw synthetic thread into yarn. The process required the spinning machine to operate within very narrow heat tolerances. Barmag represented that their machine would so operate. Relying on this representation, MacAndrews purchase the machine, paying for it with a series of
bills of exchange having varying maturity dates. MacAndrews later discovered that the machine would not perform within these tolerances and
sued to have its bills of exchange cancelled, claiming that they were promissory notes and that such cancellation could be had under Rule 10b-5. The
defendant moved -to strike the allegations on the basis that the bills of exchange here were not securities. The court disagreed holding that they were
54
securities and that Rule lOb-5 was applicable to this type of transaction.
In a similar case, the court in Janssen v. Tri-Pac Development Corp.,5 5

refused to apply Rule 10b-5. In that case, the plaintiff had purchased a
house from the defendant builder. It was later learned that the builder had
misrepresented the house in certain respects. The plaintiff sued to cancel
his promissory note under Rule 10b-5. The court disagreed and held that
the promissory note was not a security.56
I would suspect that a vast majority of the readers would agree with the
Janssen decision over the position taken in MacAndrews, yet I doubt that
many could give a logical reason for their position. They intuitively believe,
as did the court in Janssen, that the securities acts should not apply to
promissory notes of this type. Yet, a flat, unsupported statement, or an intuitive feeling is poor stuff with which to attempt to override the clear
language of the statutory definition.
Fortunately other courts have been more articulate in providing reasons
why they felt that this type of promissory note did not come within the acts.
Recently the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in Lino v. City Investing Co.,57 held that the transaction in which a promissory note was issued
to secure the purchase of a franchise agreement was not within the ambit
of the securities acts. It pointed out that the definitional sections are pre336 F. Supp. 307 (E.D. Mo. 1971).

For a discussion of these cases and the problem

generally, see Lipton & Katz, "Notes" Are (Are Not?) Always Securities-A Review,
29 Bus. LAw. 861 (1974); Comment, Commercial Notes and the Definition of "Security" Under Securities Exchange Act of 1934: A Note is a Note is a Note? 52 NEB.
L. REV. 478 (1973).

53. 339 F. Supp. 1401 (D.S.C. 1972). For a discussion of this case see Long,
Don't Forget the Securities Acts! 26 OKLA. L. REv. 160 (1973).
54. MacAndrews & Forbes Co. v. American Barmag Corp., 339 F. Supp. 1401
(D.S.C. 1972).
55. Civil No. 72-1200 (E.D. Pa., Dec. 1, 1972).
56. Citing Joseph v. Norman's Health Club, Inc., 336 F. Supp. 307 (E.D. Mo.
1971); Contract Buyers League v. F. & F. Investment, 300 F. Supp. 210 (N.D. Ill.
1969); City Nat'l Bank v. Vanderboom, 290 F. Supp. 592 (W.D. Ark. 1968), aff'd,
422 F.2d 221 (8th Cir. 1970).
57. 487 F.2d 689 (3d Cir. 1973).
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ceded by the statement that the definitions are to apply unless the context
requires otherwise. It then concluded -that there had been no "sale" within
the definition of "sale" under the act because the commercial context surrounding the issuance of this note required a finding of no sale.
The commercial context of this case requires a holding that the transaction did not involve a "purchase" of securities. These were personal
promissory notes issued by a private party. There was no public offering of the notes, and the issuer was the person claiming to be defrauded. The notes were not procured for speculation or invest-

ment. .... 58
The courts in McClure v. First National Bank5 9 and Joseph v. Norman's

Health Club, Inc. 0 recognized this approach, but also suggested an alternative approach. Instead of applying the "unless otherwise required" language
to the definition of "sale," it could be applied directly to the definition of
"security." The end result of this process would be to say that the promissory notes issued in certain commercial or consumer transactions are not
securities and therefore the securities act has no application.
I submit that this approach is far superior to that taken in the Lino case.
It should be clear, that the initial issuance of stock by the corporation is a
sale of that stock within -the meaning of the securities act. 61 Under state
corporate law the corporation must receive consideration equalling at least
the par value of the stock. Further, the Securities Act of 1933 attempts
to control only this initial distribution process. 62 As a result, many of the
registrations filed with the SEC involve the initial issuance of new shares
by the issuing corporation. How then can it be said that the initial issuance
of a promissory note is any less a sale of that note than the issuance of
the corporate stock is a sale of that stock?
Further, the Lino approach is inconsistent with the purpose behind Rule
10b-5. Its anti-fraud provisions are not limited to protecting the investor
in the initial distribution of securities. It is equally available to the defrauded purchaser or seller in subsequent secondary or trading transactions
involving securities. Thus it is clear that Rule lob-5 would apply equally
to the situation where Mr. Jones fraudulently persuades the XYZ Corporation to issue him some new previously unissued stock as it would if Mr.
Jones persuades Mr. Smith to sell him his XYZ stock practicing the same
58. Id. at 694-95. These were-the grounds for the holding in City Nat'l Bank v.
Vanderboom, 290 F. Supp. 592 (W.D. Ark. 1968), aff'd, 422 F.2d 221 (8th Cir. 1970)
and was an alternative holding in McClure v. First Nat'l Bank, 352 F. Supp. 454 (N.D.
Tex. 1973) and Joseph v. Norman's Health Club, Inc., 336 F. Supp. 307 (E.D. Mo.
1971).
59. 352 F. Supp. 454 (N.D. Tex. 1973).
60. 336 F. Supp. 307 (E.D. Mo. 1971).
61. See Sargent v. Genesco, Inc., 492 F.2d 750 (5th Cir. 1974).
62. Most of the state acts on the other hand attempt to regulate both the initial
distribution process and the entire secondary or trading market.
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fraud. Yet the negotiation of the stock- from Smith to Jones differs little
from the negotiation of the promissory note in Lino or Janssen. In all three
cases, the seller is induced to give up certain personal property on the basis
of fraud. The difference is the classification of the personal property. In
our example, the transaction clearly involves a security, while in Lino and
Janssen, the transaction does not.
The difference in the classification of stock and promissory notes lies in
the concept of investment. The stock of XYZ corporation represents the
tangible evidence of an investment in the economic capital of the corporation

at some earlier time by Smith or someone from whom he acquired the stock.
All subsequent transactions in the stock after this initial investment and the
issuance of the stock are essentially commercial transactions, similar to those
in Lino or Janssen in that one person is simply transferring personal property
to another. Yet because there was an initial investment in the stock, it became a security and this classification continues regardless of the nature of
the transactions in which the stock subsequently becomes involved. Those
transactions which involve the disposition of the security for value are
"sales" of the securities and Rule 10b-5 is applicable to all sales of securities. Thus, rule lOb-5 would apply equally to the transaction where the
stock was bartered to a dealer in exchange for a new car as where the shareholder sold the stock to a purchaser intending to hold the stock for an investment. 6
If the new car dealer in the last example immediately sells -the securities
to convert them into cash, the entire transaction becomes nothing more than
a means to finance the purchase of an item and is virtually identical to the
transaction in the Lino and Janssen cases. The promissory notes in Lino
and Janssen, however, did not come within the purview of Rule 10b-5 because their issuance resulted from a commercial financing transaction rather
than an investment transaction. 64 Thus the promissory notes did not gain
the status of a security, and the anti-fraud provisions of the securities acts
do not apply. 6 5
63. It should be obvious from what has been said that as used here "investment"
means the original investment which causes the securities to be issued. and that there
can never be more than one investment involved regardless of how many times the security may subsequently change hands. This use of "investment" considers the transaction from the side of the person receiving the consideration rather than the person furnishing the consideration. Examined in this way, the original investment constitutes
the placing of money at risk in the hands of the receiver. Subsequent sales merely
result in the seller receiving a return of his risked capital in exchange for a transfer
of the rights that resulted from the original investment to the purchaser. The purchaser's motive, be it for investment, consumption, or commercial use, is irrelevant.
64. See Lipton & Katz, "Notes" Are (Are Not?) Always Securities-A Review, 29
Bus. LAw. 861, 866 (1974).
65. This does not mean to say that the promissory notes could not be later combined with other features in such a way that an investment would take place and a
security would be created. This is essentially what happened in SEC v. Lake Havasu
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I submit that this concept of investment is not restricted to promissory
notes, but applies generally to help separate items which fall within
one or more of -the specific or general categories of the enumerative definitions which are properly classified as securities from similar items within those
categories which should not be so classified. Professor Coffey recognized
the need for such a distinction when he indicated that the concept of investment is the most important single element in distinguishing a security from
other commercial transactions. 6 This point was also recognized by the Oregon court when it held that green "trading" stamps were not securities in
Sperry & Hutchinson v. Hudson.6 7 The court there said:
The terms "evidence of indebtedness," "certificate of interest or participation in any profit-sharing agreement," and "investment contract"
as used in the act refer only to such of those types as are commonly
known as "securities;" they contemplate the presence of the investment
process, that is, "the investment of funds

.

. .

with a view to receiving

a profit through the efforts of others than the investor." 68
At present, it appears that the courts are limited in their attempts to apply this concept to distinguish between those enumerated items which they
feel are not true securities to using the escape found in the language "unless
the context otherwise requires." 69 It seems clear that our new definition
by specification should incorporate a factor which eliminates those instruments arising out of a commercial transaction, while retaining similar instruments arising from or involving an investment transaction.
Estates, 340 F. Supp. 1318 (D. Minn. 1972) and State v. Investors Sec. Corp., 209
N.W.2d 405 (Minn. 1973). In these cases, a development company was selling subdivision plots and taking promissory notes and mortgages to secure payments. These
notes, like the notes in Janssen, arose out of essentially a commercial purchase and
therefore would not meet our test as securities. However, the development company,
needing money to finance further development, began selling these notes and mortgages
to investors in conjunction with a guarantee and service contract. Both the federal and
the state court held that the second sale was the sale of a security. I submit that the
discussions are correct. The investor was investing funds in the company in exchange
for the company's guarantee of the underlying promissory note. The second transaction then was more than a commercial sale; it involved the investment element and
a security was born.
66.

Coffey, The Economic Realities of a "Security": Is There a More Meaningful

Formula? 18 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 367, 375 (1967). Coffey's exact words were:
"[R]isk to initial investment .. .is the single most important characteristic which distinguishes a security ftom the universe of other transactions."
67. 226 P.2d 501 (Ore. 1951).
68. Id. at 505 (emphasis added).
69. I am afraid that the creation of this escape is the result of a tortured construction of the introductory language. The words "unless the context otherwise requires"
suggests that within the later provisions of the statute itself a different meaning than
that found in the definitional section may be assigned a word depending upon its surrounding context. This would seem to be a very different thing indeed from altering
the basic definition founded upon a particular factual pattern where the question presented is whether the factual pattern fits within the definition. I think that this problem illustrates the particular failing of the definition of securities by enumeration rather
than by specification.
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Turning now to the formulation of our definition by specification, I think
the starting point for the definition should be the test enunciated by the
United States Supreme Court in SEC v. W.J. Howey Co. 70 for an investment
contract. The Court stated its test this way:
In other words, an investment contract for purposes of the Securities
Act means a contract, transaction or scheme whereby a person invests
his money in a common enterprise and is led to expect profits solely
from the efforts of the promoter or a third party .... 71
Justice Murphy in formulating this test for the majority disclaimed that he
was creating a new test. Instead he indicated that the concept of investment contract was found in the state acts before the enactment of the Securities Act of 1933 and that there was a substantial body of case law establishing the test he enunciated. He felt that Congress was aware of this interpretation of investment contract at the time it included the concept in the
72
federal act and intended to carry forward this definition.
Despite the fact that some of Justice Murphy's precise terms do not appear to have any historical precedent, 73 the basic test itself does find precedent in the earlier cases, not as 'a definition of an investment contract but
as the definition of a security in general.
The test first appeared in the 1923 case of Lewis v. Creasy Corp.,74 involving the Kentucky Securities Act of 1920.15 In Creasy, the Banking Commissioner sought to have the court declare that the statute was broad enough
to include any contract which could be used to defraud. The court refused
to do this, holding that the statute embraced only "what is ordinarily understood by the term 'security contract' or 'securities.' " The court then went
on to define "securities" in this way:
70. 328 U.S. 293 (1946).

71. Id. at 298-99. The test was restated in the conclusion of the opinion in this
manner: "The test is whether the scheme involves an investment of money in a common enterprise with the profits to come solely from the efforts of others." Id. at 301.
72. Id. at 298.

73. Two of the concepts, that of "solely" through the efforts of others and that
of "common enterprise," do not appear to have any historical antecedent in the cases
cited by Justice Murphy. For a detailed discussion of these cases and the Howey test
itself, see Long, An Attempt to Return "Investment Contracts" to the Mainstream of

Securities Regulation, 24 OKLA. L. REV. 135 (1971).
74. 248 S.W. 1046 (Ky. 1923).

75. Ky. Laws 1920, ch. 125, § 2, at 581.

This Act was basically an investment

company act and was patterned closely after the original Kansas Act of 1911.

Like

the earlier Kansas act, the Kentucky statute did not attempt to define a security, but
merely prohibited the sale of "any contract, stock, bonds, or other securities" without
their registration. Id. § 2, at 581. It is significant that the statute did not contain

the phrase "investment contract," this absence leading the court in Creasy to specifically reject the Gopher definition and other cases involving similar language. Lewis

v. Creasy, 248 S.W. 1046, 1049 (Ky. 1923); see Standard Home Co. v. Davis, 217
F. 904 (E.D. Ark. 1914); State v. Gopher Tire & Rubber Co., 177 N.W. 937 (Minn.
1920).
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[I]t necessarily means the investment of funds in a designated portion
of the assets or capital of a concern, with the view that the latter by
using, and operating with, the investment will earn a profit for the investor. In other words, it carries with it the idea that the investor will
earn his profit through the efforts of others than his own. It thus includes bonds, stock certificates, shareholder certificates, and other similar investments, but its definition does not include interest income from
the lending of money, or the profits which one might make by his own
efforts as the result
of any ordinary commercial contract which he
70
might enter into.
The court later summarized:
We, therefore conclude . . . that the primary purpose of Blue Sky
Laws is to protect investors from investment in securities whereby a profit
is promised and expected without any active efforts on the part of the
investor, and which scheme contemplates that the company or individual who receives the investment will employ it himself or itself in such
a manner as to reap a profit to the holder of the sold security; and
that it was not intended to apply to contracts containing mutual obligations, such as are daily entered into in commercial life, and from which
a profit 7can
only be reaped by the uses which the investor alone makes
7
of them.

Finally, the court, based upon -this definition, concluded that the contract
before it was not a security. 78 This early unsophisticated attempt at for76. Lewis v. Creasy, 248 S.W. 1046, 1048 (Ky. 1923).

77. Id. at 1049.
78. Id. at 1049; accord, Creasy Corp. v. Enz Bros. Co., 187 N.W. 666 (Wis.
1922). I generally agree with the court's definition, if certain clarifications are made,
but I tend to question the soundness of the court's conclusion based upon the facts of the
particular case. Apparently I am not alone on this later point because the Kentucky
Court of Appeals has recently held that Creasy will no longer be followed. See Scholarship Counselors, Inc. v. Waddle, 507 S.W.2d 138 (Ky. 1974).
The definition is basically sound, but needs clarification in three areas. First, the
statement concerning the lending of money is misleading unless read with the statement
about ordinary commercial transactions. The court admits that bonds, which involve
the lending of money, are securities. Therefore what the court would seem to be saying is that we must exclude those loans which are part of a commercial transaction
and do not involve the element of investment. Second, the court refuses to acknowledge that the profits which the investor expects to receive can be other than monietary.
We will see later that these profits do not have to be monetary, but merely have to
be some benefit which the investor wishes to secure. In Silver Hills Country Club v.
Sobieski, 13 Cal. Rptr. 186 (1961), the benefit was the right to use the country club
to be built with the investors' funds. See also In re Jet Set Travel Club, Notice of
Proposed Cease & Desist Order (Ore. Corp. Comm'n April 9, 1974) where the benefit
was alleged to be the right to use the club's airplane secured with investor's funds for
inexpensive group vacation trips. Finally the court fails to realize that a single contract may have both a commercial aspect and an investment aspect to it. In such a
case a security is involved. The founder-membership and Glenn Turner-type of operations are good examples of this. See, e.g., SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enterprises, Inc.,
474 F.2d 476 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 94 S. Ct. 117, 38 L. Ed. 2d 53

(1973); State Comm'r of See. v. Hawaii Mkt. Center, Inc., 485 P.2d 105 (Hawaii

1971); Scholarship Counselors, Inc. v. Waddle, 507 S.W.2d 138 (Ky. 1974).
These last two points are significant in my objection to the conclusion of the court
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mulating a definition by specification, along with the Supreme Court's more
developed test in Howey, reflects principles inherent in securities regulation
that are only now being recognized -by the courts and regulatory agencies.
The language of the Creasey case was picked up by the editors of Corpus
Juris and incorporated into its definition of a security which read:
The term "securities," as used in these laws [Blue Sky Laws], means
written assurances for the return or payment of money . . . except
where special definitions are given by statutes. . . .It means the in-

vestment of funds in a designated portion of the assets and capital of
a concern, with a view of receiving a profit through the efforts of others
than the investor; and in this sense includes what are termed "security" or "investment" contracts or "speculative securities." 7 9
It is interesting to note that the Creasey-CorpusJuris test did not receive
wide acceptance by the state courts prior to the Howey case. Creasey and
Corpus Juris were cited in only 10 cases from 1923 until 1946.80 Therefore
it is really difficult to say that this definition was established as the definition
of "investment contracts" at the time Congress passed the Securities Act of
1933 as Justice Murphy claimed.
Nevertheless the Howey definition gives us a starting point from which to
fashion our definition by specification. There are four separate components
of the Howey definition: (1) the investment of money; (2) in a common enterprise; (3) with the expectation of a profit; (4) to come solely
through the efforts of others. We will incorporate these elements in slightly
changed form into our suggested definition by specification, however, we
must first examine each in some detail to insure that these elements and
the possible ramifications of their use are understood.
There are two significant points about the "investment of money" element. Note that it is not referred to as the payment of money but as the
"investment" of money. Thus, from the very beginning we have an indication that the concept of security deals not with normal commercial transacon the particular facts of the Creasy case. The Creasy corporation was engaged in
the wholesale grocery business and was offering a contract to various retail merchants
for $300 which granted the purchaser the right to buy wholesale goods from the corporation at a cost plus 5 percent for a period of 20 years. This was basically a commercial transaction as far as the purchase or sale of groceries are concerned. The retailer's
profit here will be made from the sale of goods to the public. However, if Creasy
was using this $300 as capital in order to be able to supply the groceries, we have
an investment in its business and the expectation of a benefit, i.e. the right to receive
groceries at a discount. These factors would make the contract a security. This same
type of hybrid contract is often found in the franchise area where the sale of a franchise is combined with the raising of the capital necessary for the franchisor to fulfill
his obligations. See CAL. Arr'Y GEN. Ops. No. 66-284, [1961-1971 Transfer Binder]
CCH BLUE SKY L. REP. 70-747 (June 2, 1967); Comment, Securities: Protecting the
FranchiseeThrough the Securities Laws, 26 OKLA. L. REV. 604 (1973).
79. 37 C.J. Licenses § 168, at 275 (1925).
80. Long, An Attempt to Return "Investment Contracts" to the Mainstream of Securities Regulation, 24 OKLA. L. REv. 135, 152-153 (1971).
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tions, but only with those transactions which involve the investment process.
This alone is not sufficient to exclude many of the promissory notes discussed earlier, but it is a start in that direction. The second significant term
here is the use of the word "money." Why should we limit our definition
of security only to those cases involving the payment of money as opposed
to other forms of consideration such as property and services? The answer
may well be that Justice Murphy in Howey was faced with a situation which
involved only money investments and therefore he did not think of the ramifications of his choice of words.
I think the following illustration will indicate that we must broaden this
element to cover other forms of considerations as well. It is not uncommon
for a corporation during its initial process of formation to issue stock for
services rendered in forming the corporation or in exchange for machinery,
land or other property. Most state corporate statutes specifically authorize
such an exchange. 8' We have previously seen that the issuance of this stock
is just as much a sale of that stock as a sale for cash or a subsequent sale
of the stock by the original purchaser to a third party. 82 Furthermore there
is no question that the stock is a security. Why then, if we will say that
the exchange of stock for consideration other than cash is a sale of a security, should not our definition of security be broadened to recognize that the
investment in other forms of securities may come in other forms than cash?
This point has been brought home to several courts dealing with the
Glenn Turner-type of pyramid selling scheme where the investor is required
to perform certain acts for the corporation as a part of his purchase. The
court in Murphy v. Dare to Be Great, Inc., 83 held that the word "money"

in the Howey definition should mean "anything of value or any considera''8 4
tions, including any benefit to the promisor or detriment to the promisee.
More recently the Court of Appeals for -the Ninth Circuit made a similar
conclusion in SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enterprises,Inc.,85 where it held that

the person investing in a Turner scheme invested three things: his money,
his efforts to find other potential purchasers, and whatever it cost him to
create the illusion of affluence.8 6
Therefore I submit that we should alter this first element of Howey to
81. See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. tit. 18, § 1.76 (1971).

82. See Sargent v. Genesco, 492 F.2d 750 (5th Cir. 1974).
83. 3 CCH BLUE SKY L. REP.
71,053, at 67,276 (D.C. Super. Ct. September
20, 1972).

84. Id. at 67,282. The court then went on to hold that the activities that the pro-

spective enrollee in the Glenn Turner program were required to do, such as attend certain schools and bring pople to meetings fit within this modified definition. See also

In re Continental Marketing Assoc., Inc., 3 CCH BLUE SKY L. REP.
71,016 (Ind.
Sec. Comm'n October 27, 1969).
85. 474 F.2d 476 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 94 S.Ct. 117, 38 L. Ed.
2d 53 (1973).
86. Id. at 482.
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read "the investment of money or money's worth," so as to recognize the
ability of the investment to take other forms than cash. Yet this alteration brings with it situations which up to this point have not been considered within the scope of securities regulation. It has long been recognized
as a result of the Howey case that the sale of any property coupled with
a management contract involves a sale of a security. 87 Further we know

from the savings88 and discretionary account 9 situations that investment
may mean nothing more than entrustment of funds to the person promising
the return, since there is an expectation that the original money plus the
profits will be returned. 90
These facts together raise the question of what in the Howey situation

constitutes the sale of the security. Is it the purchase of the original property, is it the entrustment of the property under the management contract,
or is it both -together? In the vast majority of cases, this question does not
need to be answered since the investor both purchases the property and is
offered a management contract at the same time. In this case, as the
Howey court pointed out, there is an offer of a security and this is sufficient

to bring the securities acts into play. 9 1 Furthermore in a large majority
of cases most of the purchasers also take the management contract. 92 In
those cases, however, where the question has been considered, the courts
and agencies have split. There are a number of decisions which stand for
the principle that the sale of the property constitutes a sale of a security,
87. See, e.g., People v. Witzerman, 105 Cal. Rptr. 284 (Dist. Ct. App. 1972)
(holding that the purchase of cattle with a feeding agreement was a security).
88. There no longer can be any question that a savings account is a security even
when represented by nothing more than a pass book. ARIZ. ATT'Y GEN. OP., [195461 Transfer Binder] CCH BLUE SKY L. REP.
70,246 (October 26, 1954); 1 Omo
ATr'Y GEN. OP. 572 (Bricker 1933); cf. SEC v. First Am. Bank & Trust Co., 481 F.2d
673 (8th Cir. 1973); SEC v. W.L. Moody, [1972-73 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC.
L. REP.
93,619 (S.D. Tex. September 6, 1972). However these securities are normally issued by banks and therefore are usually exempted from the registration requirements, but not the anti-fraud provisions. As a result there is little litigation involving
them.
89. Marshall v. Lamson Bros. & Co., 368 F. Supp. 486 (S.D. Iowa 1974); Johnson
v. Arthur Espey, Shearson, Hammill & Co., 341 F. Supp. 764 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); Berman
v. Orimex Trading Inc., 291 F. Supp. 701 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); Maheu v. Reynolds & Co.,
282 F. Supp. 423 (S.D.N.Y. 1967). But see Milnarik v. M-S Commodities, Inc., 457
F.2d 274 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 887 (1972); Wasnowic v. Chicago Bd. of
Trade, 352 F. Supp. 1066 (M.D. Pa. 1972).
90. As we will see later neither the return of the original investment nor a monetary
profit is the earmark of a security. These factors are found however in the vast majority of securities.
91. SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 300-301 (1946). The reason for this
is that 15 U.S.C. §§ 77b(3), 77e (1970) makes the act applicable to both offers and
sales of a security. The same is true under the state acts. See Uniform Securities Act
§ 301, 1 CCH BLUE SKY L. REP. 4921, at 712 (1973).
92. In the Howey case, 85 percent of the land sold was sold with a management
contract. SEC v. W.J. Howey CO., 328 U.S. 293, 295 (1946).
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if the seller at the time of the sale realizes that the purchaser will, because
of his lack of knowledge, equipment, or experience, be forced to retain a
third party to manage the property. 95 On the other hand the California
Corporation Commission in two recent opinions has indicated that no security is involved when the property is purchased elsewhere and entrusted to
the manager. 94 I submit that the California Commission is wrong in this
position and that the entrustment of property, just as much as the entrustment of money results in the creation of a security. There are growing indications that the SEC and the courts will adopt my position.9"
This position raises the question of whether every contract in which another person is hired to manage property is to be classified as a security.
I think the answer clearly is no. I don't think, however, that the distinction
can be made on the basis that one involves the entrustment of money and
the other involves the entrustment of property. Rather, the distinction lies
in the control that the owner retains over the property. If he surrenders
complete control over the property to the manager and formally or informally agrees that he will not exercise any managerial control or decision
making, I submit there is a security involved. On the other hand, if he
merely delegates -this authority for the sake of convenience and retains practical authority to intervene at any time in the management, then a security
is not involved.
93. Continental Marketing Corp. v. SEC, 387 F.2d 466 (10th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 905 (1968); Roe v. United States, 287 F.2d 435 (5th Cir. 1961); SEC
v. Orange Grove Tracts, 210 F. Supp. 81 (D. Mass. 1962). This idea also appears
to be present, if unexpressed, in the recent decisions involving scotch whisky. See
Glen-Arden Commodities, Inc. v. Costantino, [Current Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L.
REP.
94,436 (2d Cir. March 14, 1973); SEC v. Haffenden-Rimar Int'l, Inc., 362 F.
Supp. 323 (E.D. Va. 1973); SEC v. M.A. Lundy Assoc., 362 F. Supp. 226 (D.R.I.
1973); PA. ATr'y GEN. Op. No. 49, 3 CCH BLUE SKY L. REP.
71,094 July 17,
(1973).
94. CAL. CORP. COMM'R OP. No. 72/137C, 4 CAL. CORP. COMM'R CURRENT OPS.
(October 10, 1972) (involving the entrustment of trotting horses to be trained and
raced by the recipient and a division of the profits between the trainer and the owner);
CAL. CORP. COMM'R Op. No. 69/29C, 1 CAL. CORP. COMM'R CURRENT OPS. (April

14, 1969) (involving the management of oil tank cars previously purchased). On the
other hand, the commissioner has not been reluctant to hold that a security was present
when the property was purchased and a management contract was executed concurrently. CAL. CORP. COMM'R OP. No. 73/46C, 5 CAL. CORP. COMM'R CURRENT OPS.
(March 21, 1973); CAL. CORP. COMM'R OP. No. 72/27C, 4 CAL. CORP. COMM'R CURRENT OPS. (March 6, 1972).
See also Cal. Corp. Comm'r Policy Letters 162C and
167C.
95. SEC v. Development Corp. & Distrib. Co. of America, [197-72 Transfer
Binder] CCH FE. SEC. L. REP. T 93,358 (W.D. Wash., filed December 1, 1971) (consent injunction subsequently entered); State ex rel. Healy v. Development Corp., No.
73460 (Ore. Cir. Ct., Marion County, July 2, 1971) (temporary restraining order);
State v. Idea Dev. & Marketing, Inc., No. 9-73-09887 (N.M. Dist. Co., Bernalillo
County, filed September 26, 1973); Kentucky Blood Horse, Ltd., [1973 Transfer
Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
79,430 (SEC NAL June 13, 1973) (involving race
horse training similar to the California opinion supra note 94).
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It has also been questioned as to whether a sale is involved in an entrustment situation. The answer to this would seem to be ,that we have no difficulty finding a sale of the security when money is entrusted in the savings
and discretionary account cases, so there should be no difficulty in finding
a "sale" in the property entrustment cases. The sale arises in the turning
over of the property to a recipient and giving him the right to use that property to generate a return. This right to use is a valuable consideration and
can be the consideration for -the issuance of the security. We will see this
theory being used more and more in the area of corporate marketing of
inventor's ideas.9 6
The second element of the Howey test is the expectation of a profit.
There are a number of things we need to keep in mind here. First is whose
expectation of profit. Clearly it is the investor's expectation, not the issuer
of the security. Unfortunately, a number of early cases held that a security
would not be present if the investor received a return when the issuer did
not make a profit.9 7 To realize the fallacy of this argument one needs only
to remember that a bond or other evidence of indebtedness requires the
issuer to pay the return regardless of its own profits as long as it is solvent.
Profit here does not mean .profits in the sense of profits and losses; it means
the payment of any consideration to the investor whether it be in the form
98
of commissions, dividends, interest, or the like.
It should be obvious that in the vast majority of cases the "profits" expected will be some type of monetary return. 99 Yet does our definition of
a security demand that this profit be monetary? I submit that it does not.
State corporate statutes allow the payment of dividends in stock or in kind as
well as in money. 10 0 Why then could not a profit on other forms of securities
be in the form of property or additional securities? Beyond this, does the
"profit" even have to be tangible property? I submit that it does not.
The leading case suggesting that the "profits" does not have to be a tangible benefit is Silver Hills Country Club v. Sobieski.' 0' In that case, the
investor was asked to put up money for a membership in a country club
96. See cases cited supra note 95.
97. Emery v. So-Soft, Inc., 199 N.E.2d 120, 125 (Ohio Ct. App. 1964).
98. State Comm'r of Sec. v. Hawaii Mkt. Center, Inc., 485 P.2d 105, 109 (Hawaii
1971); see Hannan & Thomas, The Importance of Economic Reality and Risk in De-

fining Federal Securities, 25 HASTNGS L.J. 219, 238 (1974).
99. This return however may not involve the return of the original consideration.
In the Glenn Turner and founder-membership cases, the issuer of the securities got the
consideration paid by the purchaser and the "investor" only received the right to a commission for introducing new members into the orgainzation, or, in the case of the
founder-membership schemes, an additional commission on sales to people using the
cards distributed by the member. The courts have had no difficulty holding that these
are securities. See, e.g., SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enterprises, Inc., 474 F.2d 476 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 94 S.Ct. 117, 38 L. Ed. 2d 53 (1973); State Comm'r
of Sec. v. Hawaii Mkt. Center, Inc., 485 P.2d 105 (Hawaii 1971).
100. See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. tit. 18, §§ 1.132, 1.134 (1971).
101. 13 Cal. Rptr. 186 (1961).
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which was to be built by the promoters. The members were not to receive
any ownership interest in the club and their only return on their investment
was the right to use the country club facilities. The court had no
problem holding this to be a security. It is true that this case was decided

under the former California statute which provided that promissory notes
of non-profit corporations, whether interest-bearing or not, were securities,
lending some credence to an argument that "profits" was not considered a
necessary element under California law. The California Corporation Commission has nevertheless continued to apply the Silver Hills standard under
the present California law which has no such provision. 10 2 Similarly, the
Oregon Corporation Commissioner has used the benefits test in two recent
03
opinions.'
Recently the question has been raised whether the extended concept of
benefits as opposed to "profits" is a desirable feature in the Howey setting,
since it would have the effect of making every executory contract into a
security.10 4 The suggestion was that the extended concept of benefit should
be limited to the "risk capital" situation also introduced by the Silver Hills
case. 10 5 There is a merit to this argument as it applies to the original
Howey test. However the definition by specification that we are developing here also will include the risk capital concept' 00 and will contain
102. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. COMM'R Op. No. 72/61C,
RENT OPS. (May 15, 1972); CAL. CORP. COMM'R Op.
COMM'R. CURRENT OPS. (June 7, 1972).

4 CAL. CORP. COMM'R CURNo. 72/73C, 4 CAL. CORP.

103. In Vacations Unlimited, an opinion letter of the Oregon Corporations Commissioner dated December 18, 1973, argued that the purchaser in a time-sharing condominium to be built by the seller received sufficient benefit in the form of the right to occupy the condominium for a fixed period each year to make the sale the sale of a security. More recently, in In re Jet Set Travel Club, Notice of Proposed Cease & Desist
Order (Ore. Corp. Comm'r April 9, 1974), Commissioner Healy argued that the purchaser of a travel club membership had received a sufficient benefit through the right
to use the club's airplane for future vacations to make the membership a security.
104. Hannan & Thomas, The Importance of Economic Reality and Risk in Defining
Federal Securities, 25 HASTINGS L.J. 219, 245 (1974).
105. Id. at 245. This argument presupposes that the risk capital test in Silver Hills
is a completely separate test for investment contracts from that established in Howey.
This is an open question in both California and Oregon where the "benefits" concept
has been applied. The Oregon court of appeals indicated that the risk capital test is
an alternative test to the Howey test in State ex rel. Healy v. Consumer Bus. Sys., Inc.,
482 P.2d 549, 554 (Ore. 1971). The problem is more difficult in California. Unfortunately the California court in Silver Hills did not say whether it was creating an additional or replacement test for the Howey definition. Earlier the California court, in
People v. Syde, 235 P.2d 601 (1951), had adopted the Howey definition. This has
led the California Corporation Commission to treat the two as alternative tests. Compare CAL. CORP. COMM'R OP. No. 73/42C, 5 CAL. CORP. COMM'R CURRENT OPS.
(March 20, 1973), with CAL. CORP. COMM'R Op. No. 73/81C, 5 CAL. CORP. COMM'R
CURRENT OPS. (May 31, 1973). The continued validity of this alternative test interpretation may be in question as a result of the recent decision in Hamilton Jewelers
v. Department of Corps., 112 Cal Rptr. 387 (Dist. Ct. App. 1974).

106. See text accompanying note 149 infra.
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other provisions designed to eliminate those executory contracts which do
not have the appropriate characteristics. Therefore, for the purposes of our
definition, it is appropriate to change the Howey concept of expectation of
"profits" into the broader concept of expectation of "benefit" with the understanding that the benefit can be either tangible in the form of money or
property or intangible in the form of a right to use the facilities created or
any other benefit which the investor has bargained to receive.
The next element of the Howey definition requires that this profit must
be generated "solely through the efforts of others." This requirement has
spawned a number of problems. First, it is important to distinguish
between determining the amount of the "profit" and the generation of the
fund from which this "profit" is to be paid. This point has recently become
10 7
very important in the consideration of the commodity option as a security.
It should be apparent that the investor participates in the process of determining the amount of his "profit" by the selection of the investment he
chooses to make. Thus he can refuse to invest unless the issuer pays him
a 8 percent return on his bond, preferred stock, or savings account. The
investor determines the amount of his "profit" by deciding how long he will
retain his investment. Clearly we cannot mean, when we talk about "profits solely through the efforts of others," this determination of the amount
of profits because no investment would ever be a security if we did. Therefore, this concept must deal with the generation of the fund from which the
"profits" or "benefits" are to come.
The second point that we must consider is the type of "efforts" required. Originally, several courts took the position that any type of
effort by the investor would prevent the scheme from being a security,' 0 8
The absurdity of this position can be seen from carrying it to its logical extreme. Under the Howey fact situation, this would mean that securities
classification could be avoided by a requirement inserted in the management
contract that the investor must pick a single orange from his plot. 10 9 This
position has now all but been abandoned." 0 The courts now recognize that
"efforts" refer to managerial efforts or to the right to make the decisions
which will determine whether the investment is a success or failure."'
107. See Borton & Abrahams, Options on Commodity Futures Contracts as Securities in California, 29 Bus. LAW. 867 (1974); Long, The Naked Commodity Option
Contract as a Security, 15 WM. & MARY L. REV. 211 (1974).

108. Gallion v. Alabama Mkt. Centers, Inc., 213 So. 2d 841 (Ala. 1968); Georgia
Mkt. Centers, Inc. v. Fortson, 171 S.E.2d 620 (Ga. 1969); Bruner v. State, 463 S.W.2d
205 (Tex. Crim. App. 1970); Koscot Interplanetary, Inc. v. King, 452 S.W.2d 531

(Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1970, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
109. In fairness to some of the courts taking this position, they did indicate that
a de minimis effort on the part of the investor would be disregarded.
gia Mkt. Centers, Inc. v. Fortson, 171 S.E.2d 620, 623 (Ga. 1969).

See, e.g., Geor-

110. But see SEC v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 365 F. Supp. 588 (N.D. Ga. 1973).
111. See, e.g., SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enterprises, Inc., 474 F.2d 476, 482 (9th
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To me this participation in the management of the investment is the key
to the entire concept of the securities acts. When an investor is asked to
turn over his money or property to another who will then use that money
or property to generate a 'benefit or return, part or all of which will inure
to the investor, the investor is undertaking a risk that the investment will
not be successful and that he will not receive his benefit. If the investor
shares in the management of the project and the decisions which determine
whether the investment is a success or failure, then he does not need the
protection of the securities acts because he is the master of his own destiny,
and his position gives him -the right to demand all -the information necessary
to make the appropriate 'business decisions. But when he does not have
such a right and is dependent on the judgment of another, then he needs
protection. Both state and federal securities acts are aimed at providing
this protection. The registration provisions attempt to see that the investor
receives complete information about both the project in which he is asked
to invest and the people who control it and who will be making his
decisions concerning the investment. The anti-fraud provisions attempt
to insure that this information is accurate. Armed with this accurate information, the investor, in theory at least, will then select only the sound
investments, and those containing the type of risk that he is willing
to bear. Thus, the securities acts are designed to provide the investor protection when the nature of the interest acquired does not carry with it a
right to share in the management of the project. It is important, therefore,
to understand that the right to 'participate in the control or management of
the project must stem from the interest acquired, not from some other relationship that the investor may have with the project.
The classic example of this concept is common stock in a corporation.
Here the shareholder does not directly control the management or decision1 12
making process of the corporation. This control, by state corporation law,
resides in the directors of -the corporation, who exercise it through the officers and agents of the corporation. The only right of the shareholders is
the indirect right to elect and remove the directors. Thus, the nature of
the investment requires that the investor be given protection. Nor should
the fact that the shareholder is also an officer or director of the corporation
and, in that capacity, participates in the management and control of the corporation, alter the nature or classification of his shares as securities.1 18
Cir.), cert. denied,

-

U.S. -,

94 S. Ct. 117, 38 L. Ed. 2d 53 (1973); Lino v. City

Investing Co., 487 F.2d 689, 692 (3d Cir. 1973); State Comm'r of Sec. v. Hawaii Mkt.

Center, Inc., 485 P.2d 105, 111 (Hawaii 1971).
112. See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. tit. 18, § 1.34 (1971).
71,016,
113. In re Continental Marketing Assoc., Inc., 3 CCH BLUE SKY L. REP.
at 67,179 (Ind. Sec. Comm'n October 27, 1969). This fact may be significant as to
whether the registration procedure is necessary as to this individual and whether the
sale to him should be an exempt transaction, however, it should not alter the status

of his shares as securities,
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Probably the best illustration of an interest that may or may not constitute
a security outside of -the corporate setting is the partnership. Under the
Uniform Limited Partnership Act, -the limited partners may not participate
in the management of the partnership.1 14 Therefore the interest of a
limited partner is always a security. 115 On the other hand, in the normal general partnership, the partner has the right to participate in the management of the partnership and control partnership affairs. This factor
should mean that his interest is not a security. 116 There is one important
caveat to this statement. The rights of the partners are governed by agreement among themselves and, if the partners agree formally in their partnership agreement, or informally that -the actual management of the partnership will be left -to a managing partner or committee, then interests of the
17
remaining general partners would become securities.'
This raises 'the final question under this element. Should the requirement
be that the efforts must come solely through the efforts of others? We have
seen earlier that this portion of the Howey test finds little support in the
state cases which preceded it. Recently, a number of courts looking for a
way to avoid the undesirable effect of applying the Howey test have adopted
the approach that the "solely" part of the test should be changed to "substantially through the efforts of others.""18 Probably the best known example of this approach is SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enterprises," 9 where
the court said:
Strict interpretation of the requirement that profits to be earned
must come "solely" from the efforts of others has been subject to criticism. Adherence to such an interpretation could result in a mechanical, unduly restrictive view of what is and what is not an investment
contract. It would be easy to evade by adding a requirement that the
buyer contribute a modicum of effort. Thus the fact that the investors
here were required to exert some efforts if a return were to be achieved
114. Uniform Limited Partnership § 7 (1917). See generally J. CRANE & A. BROM§ 26(c) (1968). This prohibition does not prevent him from
working for the partnership or for making decisions concerning the partnership as an
employee of the partnership. See, e.g., Grainger v. Antoyan, 313 P.2d 848, 853 (Cal.
1957); Silvola v. Rowlett, 272 P.2d 287, 290 (Colo. 1954).
115. Curtis v. Johnson, 234 N.E.2d 566, 573 (Il. Ct. App. 1968); Reiter v. Greenberg, 288 N.Y.S.2d 57, 61 (1968); N.D. ATT'Y GEN. OP., [1961-71 Transfer Binder]
CCH BLUE SKY L. RaP.
70,799 (November 15, 1968). These cases are discussed
in detail in Long, Partnership, Limited Partnership, and Joint Venture Interests as Securities, 37 Mo. L. REV. 581, 61-1-12 (1972).
116. For a discussion of this point, see Long, Partnership,Limited Partnership, and
Joint Venture Interests as Securities, 37 Mo L. REV.581, 612-15 (1972).
117. Pawgan v. Silverstein, 265 F. Supp. 898, 900 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
118. This approach was first adopted in State Comm'r of Sec. v. Hawaii Mkt.
BERG, PARTNERSHIPS

Center, Inc., [1961-71 Transfer Binder] CCH BLUE SKY L. RaP. 70,880 (Hawaii Cir
Ct., October 21, 1970), af 'd on other grounds, 485 P.2d 105 (Hawaii 1971). It was
later picked up and used in D.M.C. v. Hays, [1961-71 Transfer Binder] CCH BLUE
SKY L. Rap.
70,897 (Colo. Dist. Ct. February 26, 1971).
119. 474 F.2d 476 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, - U.S; -, 94 S. Ct. 117, 38 L. Ed.
2d 53 (1973).
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should not automatically preclude a finding that the Plan or Adventure
is an investment contract. To do so would not serve the purpose of
the legislation. Rather we adopt a more realistic test, whether the efforts made by those other than the investor are the undeniably significant ones, those essential 12managerial efforts which affect the failure
or success of the enterprise.'
121
This approach has recently been approved by other federal courts.
This approach is unfortunate. It would be an appropriate test if we
were dealing with physical efforts necessary to make the project a success. I submit, however, that once we determine as we have, that the
"efforts" refers not to physical activities of the investor but to his right to
share in the management or decision-making process in the project, that the
"solely" test is the appropriate test. He either has the right to share in these
decisions or he does not. We should not attempt to make a qualitative
analysis of his right. A partnership example will illustrate my point.
We have indicated that the interest of a general partner is not normally a
security because he shares in the management process. Let us then contrast
the two-partner law firm with the 400-partner national accounting firm. In
the case of the law firm, each partner, assuming no partnership agreement
to the contrary, would have one vote in partnership affairs. Under, the
Glenn Turner test his "efforts" would clearly be significant and his interest
would not be a security. However, in the case of the accountant, again
assuming that the partnership agreement has nothing to the contrary, 12 2 he
has a voice in management, albeit his voice is only one in 400. Under the
"solely" test as I have outlined it, his interest is still not a security because
he shares in management and management is not left "solely" to others.
Under the Glenn Turner test, I feel that his management voice would be
so small that it could not be said to be significant and therefore his interest
would be a security. I cannot reconcile the difference in treatment between
identical -types of interests. Either both are securities or neither are. Our
test then should alter the Howey "solely through the efforts of others" to
read "where the investor has no direct control over the investment or policy
decisions of the venture."
The last element of the Howey test is the common enterprise test. This
element has been giving the courts increasing problems within the last year
especially in the areas of commodity option contracts 23 and discretionary
120. Id. at 482 (citations omitted).
121. Miller v. Central Chinchilla Group, Inc., [Current Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L.
REP.
94,465 (8th Cir. March 28, 1974); Lino v. City Investing Co., 487 F.2d 689,

692 (3d Cir. 1973); Mitzner v. Cardet Int'l, Inc., 358 F. Supp. 1262, 1267 (N.D. Ill.
1973).
122. If management is concentrated into a small management group, then the nonmanagement interests become a security. See case cited note 117 supra.
123.

See SEC v. Continental Commodities Corp., Civ. No. CA 3-6976-D (N.D.

Tex. April 9, 1973); International Commodity Trust, Inc. v. Fisher, 3 CCH BLUE SKY
L. REP.
71,075 (Okla. Dist. Ct. May 14, 1973); Shapiro v. First Federated Corn-
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trading accounts. 124
Presently there are two theories as to what is necessary for a common
enterprise to exist. One view, attempting to equate common enterprise with
the idea of a joint venture, holds that there must be a pooling of investor
funds.' 2 5 Under this theory, if there is only one investor who puts his
money in the hands of a person who will manage it, there is no common
enterprise between the investor and the manager. Further, if the manager
has solicited funds from a number of people to manage, but he does not
pool these funds, again there is no common enterprise among -the various
investors. This view is based upon the fact in the Howey case the land
was pooled and farmed as a unit.' 2 6 Unfortunately, this view appears to
be the predominant view in the federal courts at the moment, at least in
the areas of commodity options and discretionary accounts. 1 27 This fact has
caused several state courts to reject the concept of common enterprise com28
pletely.
The other view, represented by the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Los Angeles Trust Deed & Mortgage Exchange v. SEC 29 and SEC
v. Glenn W. Turner Enterprises, Inc., 130 is that common enterprise means
nothing more than that the fortunes of the investor are interwoven with and
dependent upon the efforts and success of either those seeking the investment
or of a third party."' Under this theory, there is a common enterprise
existing between the investor and the person soliciting his funds to manage,
132
as in the case of a discretionary account.
This latter approach is much more sound. Used in this way, I think
that it does have an appropriate place in the definition of a security.
modity Trust Corp., 3 CCH BLUE SKY. L. REP.
71,071 (Md. Cir. Ct. May 30,
1973).
124. Milnarik v. M-S Commodities, Inc., 457 F.2d 274 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 887 (1972); Stuckey v. DuPont, Glore, Forgan, Inc., 59 F.R.D. 129 (N.D. Cal.
1973); Wasnowic v. Chicago Bd. of Trade, 352 F. Supp. 1066 (M.D. Pa. 1972).

125. The leading case taking this position is Milnarik v. M-S Commodities, Inc., 457

F.2d 274, 277 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 887 (1972).

126. This approach, however, ignores the fact that each investor signed an individual management contract.

127. Milnarik v. M-S Commodities, Inc., 457 F.2d 274 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 887 (1972); Stuckey v. DuPont, Glore, Forgan, Inc., 59 F.R.D. 129 (N.D. Cal.
1973); Wasnowic v. Chicago Bd. of Trade, 352 F. Supp. 1066 (M.D. Pa. 1972); SEC
v. Continental Commodities Corp., Civ. No. CA 3-6976-D (N.D. Tex. April 9, 1973).
But see Marshall v. Lamson Bros. & Co., 368 F. Supp. 486, 489 (S.D. Iowa 1974).
128. State v. Investors Sec. Corp., 209 N.W.2d 405 (1973); Shapiro v. First Federated Commodity Trust Co., 3 CCH BLUE SKY L. REP. 71,071, at 67,336 (Md. Cir.
Ct., May 30, 1973). It should be remembered that the concept of common enterprise

is not found in the state cases preceding Howey.

129. 285 F.2d 162 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 919 (1961).
130. 474 F.2d 476 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 94 S. Ct. 117, 38 L. Ed.
2d 53 (1973).
131. Id. at 482-83; Los Angeles Trust Deed & Mortgage Exch. v. SEC, 285 F.2d
162, 172 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 919 (1961).

132. Marshall v. Lamson Bros. &Co., 368 F. Supp. 486 (S.D. Iowa 1974).
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It emphasizes again that a security involves a community of effort-one person or group furnishing the capital; another the management or skill necessary to bring about the planned result. However, "common enterprise," as
opposed to the concept of "joint venture," does not require, as suggested
by Milnarik v. M-S Commodities,133 that the management participants
have to share directly in the return or benefit generated. The manager
can be strictly a salaried or commissioned manager as in the case of the
discretionary account, 1 4 or he may make his profit from the original sale
of the object cared for.' 3 5. It is also important to understand that
the concept of "common enterprise" does not mean a single legal entity embracing the entire project. Again the facts of the Howey case itself dispel
this notion. The land in Howey was sold by one corporation, serviced by
another, and owner by the investor. While there was a common project
among the three, the raising of citrus fruit, they all constituted separate legal
entities. In many cases, such as stocks or bonds in a corporation, the enterprise will be embraced by a single legal entity, but the concept of "common
enterprise" does not demand it.
The concept of "common enterprise" also serves another very vital
function in the definition of a security. It helps to separate certain
investments which under current thinking are not securities from those that
are. The term "enterprise" suggests that something active is done to bring
about the increase in value leading to the "profit" or "benefit" expected.
Professor Loss expressed the idea this way:
[No security] is involved when a person invests in real estate, with the
hope perhaps of earning a profit as the result of a general increase in
values concurrent with the development of the neighborhood, as long
as he does not do so as a part of an enterprise whereby it is expressly
or impliedly understood that the property will be developed or operated
by others.' 36
Used in this manner, the concept of "enterprise" illustrates the difference
between the buying of a lot for investment purposes in a subdivision where
the subdivision owner 'has a comprehensive plan of development, which
would be the purchase of a security,' 37 from the purchase of a similar lot
133. 457 F.2d 274 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 887 (1972).
134. As in the case of Marshall v. Lamson Bros. & Co., 368 F. Supp. 486 (S.D.
Iowa 1974).
135. In the Howey case itself, the Howey company made its profit from the sale
of the land originally. The Howey-in-the-Hills service company received a management fee arising from caring for and cultivating the land, but there was no actual division of the profits resulting from the sale of the fruit produced.
136. 1 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 491-92 (2d ed. 1961).
137. Hall v. Security Planning Serv., Inc., 371 F. Supp. 7, 14 (D. Ariz. 1974); Johnson v. Suburban Land Inv. Co., [1973 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
94,022 (D.C. Super. Ct. June 1, 1973); HAWAII AT-'VY GEN. Op. No. 70-25, [196170,882 (October 15, 1970); Mancini
71 Transfer Binder] CCH BLUE SKY L. REP.
v. GAC Corp., Civ. No. 72-45-TUC-JAW (D. Ariz., filed 1973), discussed in Hannan
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where no systematic development is planned, which would not be a security.
In the first case the investor is looking for the return on his money from
a concerted effort which is intended to raise the value of the lot, whereas
in the second case he is expecting his profit from the unrelated general development of the area or the historic general increase in land values.
For these reasons we will include the concept of common enterprise in
our definition by specification, but because of the confusion that presently
surrounds the concept of "common enterprise" I have elected to select the
term "venture" to represent the concepts outlined here.
The Howey definition appears to be deficient in two areas, both of which
have been noted above. First, it does not attempt to distinguish in a meaningful way between those instruments given in a commercial transaction
from those arising in an investment one. We have seen that this is a glaring
deficiency in the basic definition by enumeration itself. Thus, Howey gives
us no help in eliminating from securities act coverage the promissory note
given for the purchase of an automobile or refrigerator, a transaction we
have already concluded ought not to be covered.
Second, the Howey test, as modified to include expectation of non-monetary benefits as well as monetary ones, does not eliminate the ordinary contract involving the prepayment for goods to be delivered in the future.
Many of these contracts are not securities. One would hardly claim 'that
a contract to buy a new Ford where the purchaser makes payment now and
expects the car to be delivered later is a security.' 3 8 On the other hand,
139
there are many prepayment contracts that do involve a security.
Consequently, to make the Howey definition as we have modified it into
a definition for securities by specification we need to add some additional
element to cover these points. These points can be dealt with by -the
addition of the concept of "risk capital." The concept of "risk capi& Thomas, The Importance of Economic Reality and Risk in Defining Federal Securities, 25 HASTINGS L.J. 219, 275-76 nn.212 & 213 (1974).

138. The buying of a new Tucker on the other hand is a different story. The SEC
held Tucker franchise agreements which required dealers to make deposits toward cars

they were to receive were securities. In re Tucker Corp., 26 S.E.C. 249 (1947).
139. The borderline problem is well illustrated by CAL. CORP. COMM'R Op. No. 72/
43C, 4 CAL. CORP. COMM'R CURRENT OP. (April 20, 1972).

Here the question was

asked whether the sale of a publication of the history of Tulare County, California
involved a security. The publisher, in order to finance the printing of the history, proposed to sell space for a family biography to the leading citizens of the county. In
exchange for the payment they were to receive a copy of the completed book. One
of the sponsors had advanced $50,500 of the money necessary to print the book. The
remaining cost, some $10,000, was going to come from the sale of the biography space.
The California commissioner held that this was not the sale of a security because it
was a typical commercial transaction of the type often used in the printing industry.
I will not dispute that the contract may be a typical publishing industry transaction,
but I am not convinced that this contract is not a security for the reasons to be outlined.
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tal" is not new to securities regulation. It finds its roots in the early
case of Brownie Oil Co. v. Railroad Commission,a40 a concept which did not
receive wide attention until expressed by Justice Traynor in his now famous
opinion in Silver Hills Country Club v. Sobieski.141 In referring to the
scheme to build a country club from money raised from the sale of memberships where the members would have no proprietary ,interest in the club,
but merely the right to use the facilities once constructed, Justice Traynor
said:
We have here nothing like the ordinary sale of a right to use existing facilities. Petitioners are soliciting the risk capital with which to
develop a business for profit. The purchaser's risk is not lessened
merely because the interest he purchases is labeled a membership. Only
because he risks his capital along with other purchasers can there
be
42
any chance that the benefits of club membership will materialize.1
Later in the opinion Justice Traynor restated the idea of risk capital this
way:
Since the act does not make profit to the supplier of capital the test
of what is a security, it seems all the more clear that its objective is
to afford those who risk their capital at least a fair chance of realizing
their objectives in legitimate ventures whether
143 or not they expect a return on their capital in one form or another.
Let us now see how this risk capital concept can supply the needed elements outlined above. It should be clear that in any case where there is
a present payment for goods to be delivered in the future, there is the risk
that the person contracted with will not be financially able to perform his
obligation. This is a commercial risk inherent in any business contract and
should not make the contract a security. This is not the risk however -that
Justice Traynor is talking about in the Silver Hills case. Justice Traynor
44
is concerned rather with a second risk, the investment or enterprise risk.'
This risk is present in all corporate stocks and bonds. The original investor
in these securities turns over to the corporation consideration which the corporation will use to generate a fund from which the promised benefit will
be paid. The investor must suffer the risk that his consideration will be
dissipated to creditors and others before the corporation has ,the opportunity
to generate the benefit promised and expected. All that Justice Traynor
and the court in Brownie Oil before him -are saying is that whenever this
risk is present we have a security-regardless of what name is given to the
instrument calling for the investment. Thus, when a person is approached
and asked to provide -the necessary capital to produce goods by prepaying
140. 240 N.W. 827 (Wis. 1932).
141. 13 Cal. Rptr. 186 (1961).
142. Id. at 188 (emphasis added).
143. Id. at 188-89.
144. For an excellent discussion of this in the context of commodity option contracts, see Ga. Securities Release No. 1, 1 CCH BLUE SKY L. REP. T 14,612, at 10,504
(Ga. Sec. Comm'n September 18, 1973).
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for them, he is forced to suffer this investment risk and the contract involves the sale of a security. If, on the other hand, the producer presently
has the necessary capital to produce the goods, then prepayment does not
result in an assumption of the investment risk, only the normal commercial
risk, and no security is involved.
Two further comments need to be made about this concept. First, it
should be apparent that I am not using "capital" in the traditional accounting or balance sheet sense of an equity interest in the corporation represented by capital stock and surplus. Rather I am using "capital" in the
broad economic sense of the pool of resources necessary to fund a particular
project. This economic capital can come from borrowing as well as the sale
of equity interest. Both the borrowing and the equity interests can take the
traditional forms of promissory notes, bonds, or stock, or more untraditional
forms such as the prepayment of memberships in the Silver Hills case or
the right to receive commissions on future sales as in the Glenn Turner or
founder-membership type scheme. Second, while there are some indications
that California will so limit it, 1 45 the risk capital concept should not be limited to original or initial risk capital. 46 It should apply equally to the new
company seeking the initial financing to start its business as well as to the
old-line, established corporation seeking to raise the capital necessary to start
a new line or to extend production under its old business. Additionally,
the risk capital classification cannot be avoided by obtaining temporary fi148
nancing 14 7 or placing the money taken in escrow for a limited period.
Turning finally to the problem of eliminating the commercial transactions
from coverage under the securities acts, this can be accomplished by taking
the concept of risk capital and combining it with the concept of venture
we developed earlier. The risk capital obtained must be invested in
the venture in order that the resulting debt instrument constitute a security.
Thus, in the case of the consumer purchase of an automobile or refrigerator or the personal loan from a finance company, the resulting
promissory notes would fall outside of the securities act because the promissory note did not result from the investment in the risk capital of a venture.
The consumer or the borrower is not going to use the money or property
145. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. COMM'R OP. No. 72/61C, 4 CAL. CORP. COMM'R CUR-

RENT OPS. (May 15, 1972).

146. State ex rel. Parks v. Glenn W. Turner Enterprises, Inc., 3 CCH BLUE SKY
L. REP. 71,023, at 67,202 (Idaho Dist. Ct. March 29, 1972).
147. Thus in the founder-membership situation where the company is going to open
a membership department store, the risk capital test cannot be met by the company securing the merchandise to stock the store on consignment or through the process of
leased departments. See CAL. CORP. COMM'R Op. No. 73/51C, 5 CAL. CORP. COMM'R
CURRENT OPS. (March 22, 1973).
148. CAL. CORP. COMM'R OP. No. 73/49C, 5 CAL. CORP. COMM'R CURRENT OPS.
(March 21, 1973); CAL. CORP. COMM'R Op. No. 73/19C, 5 CAL. CORP. COMM'R CURRENT OPS. (February 12, 1973); CAL. CORP. COMM'R Op. No. 72/99C, 4 CAL. CORP.
COMM'R CURRENT OPS. (July 31, 1972).
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acquired in exchange for his note to generate the money necessary to satisfy
the obligation to repay. The funds to pay the promissory note will come
from other activities of the consumer borrower, probably from his employment. Admittedly this distinction does not eliminate those commercial transactions or loans where the equipment or money is employed in the generation
of the fund used to satisfy the obligation to pay, such as where the refrigerator
is used in a restaurant. From the point of view of the purchaser of the
goods or the borrower, he is seeking an investment of risk capital in his venture. From the point of view of the seller of the goods or the lender, he
may not know or care that the consideration has become part of the risk
capital of the venture. But as we have seen earlier, we must nevertheless
consider the concept of investment from the side of the recipient, not the
9

investor.14

In summary, what is a security?

A security is the investment of money

or money's worth including goods furnished and/or services performed in
the risk capital of a venture with the expectation of some benefit to the investor where -the investor has no direct control over the investment or policy
decisions of the venture. 15 0
149. For those who are still concerned whether these transactions should be included
within the coverage of the securities act, there is another concept which might be used
to eliminate them. We can say that "risk capital" is only that portion of the consideration received for the rights in question, which exceeds the fair value of those rights.
This approach was adopted in CAL. CORP. COMM'R Op. No. 72/76C, 4 CAL. CORP.
COMM'R CURRENT OPs. (June 22, 1972) where the commissioner held that the fee prepaid for the use of the campgrounds to be constructed would not substantially exceed
the actual benefits realized. However, this approach seems to beg the question. It
separates that which can be considered capital from that which can be considered legitimate pre-payment of profits. But the profit has not yet been earned, and the investor
has the risk that he will not receive his benefit. The membership fee in the Silver
Hills case may have represented fair value for the right to use the facilities to be created, but the risk is that the facilities never will be created. This is what makes the
interest a security. See also Hamilton Jewelers v. Department of Corps., 112 Cal.
Rptr. 387 (Dist. Ct. App. 1974).
150. This definition has now been adopted by the Oklahoma legislature as one of
the alternative definitions of a security. OKLA. STAT., tit. 71, § 2(19)(P) (Supp.
1973). This definition also closely follows that outlined in Coffey, The Economic Realities of a "Security": Is There a More Meaningful Formula? 18 CAsE W. REs. L.
REv. 367 (1967). Coffey's definition served as the basis for the Supreme Court of
Hawaii's formulation of a definition of investment contract which combined the liberal
interpretation of Howey and the risk capital test. The court in State Comm'r of Sec.
v. Hawaii Market Center, Inc., 485 P.2d 105, 109 (Hawaii 1971) said:
[W]e hold that for the purposes of the Hawaii Uniform Securities Act (Modified)
an investment contract is created whenever:
(1) An offeree furnishes initial value to an offeror, and
(2) a portion of this initial value is subjected to the risks of the enterprise, and
(3) the furnishing of the initial value is induced by the offeror's promises or representations which give rise to a reasonable understanding that a valuable benefit
of some kind, over and above the initial value, will accrue to the offeree as a
result of the operation of the enterprise, and
(4) the offeree does not receive the right to exercise practical and actual control
over the managerial decisions of the enterprise.
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